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This article explores the impact of the Human Rights Act (HRA) 1998 on the police 
service of England and Wales. It draws upon qualitative data produced during 
interviews with police personnel to provide the first empirical study of the influence 
of the HRA on the police service at an organizational level and on the day-to-day 
working practices of police officers. Whilst the fundamental aim of the HRA is to 
protect and enhance citizens’ rights and freedoms, we argue that there is little 
evidence to suggest that it has promoted a greater awareness of, and respect for, 
human rights amongst police officers. Rather, the HRA has become institutionalized 
by the police service into a series of bureaucratic processes that, although requiring 
conformity by officers, do not encourage active consideration of human rights issues. 
Instead of shaping police work to make it more responsive to human rights, 
bureaucratic processes are used by officers to legitimize and justify their existing 
practices. Focusing on ‘risks’ rather than ‘rights’, officers satisfy the ‘tests’ 
introduced by the HRA through an assessment of the dangers posed by particular 
individuals and crime types and the resource implications of effectively managing 
them. An important result of this is that the HRA is not used to achieve a balance 
between individual rights and community interests, but becomes a framework for 
mandating police decision making and protecting officers from criticism and blame. 
 
Introduction 
This article explores the impact of the Human Rights Act (HRA) 1998 on the police 
service of England and Wales. The HRA is significant for policing because, 
incorporating the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) into English law, it 
places a legal requirement on the police service, as a public authority, to respect the 
human rights of individuals. Whilst the United Kingdom has a long association with 
the ECHR—it signed the Convention at its inception in 1950, was the first Council of 
Europe state to ratify it in 1951 and granted the right of individual petition to the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in 1966—the HRA gives the rights 
contained in the Convention significantly new and important domestic legal effect. 
Public authorities must not only conform to the requirements of the HRA but, if they 
do not, individuals can seek direct redress for violations of their rights in the domestic 
courts rather than through application to the ECtHR. In light of this, public authorities, 
including the police, are subject to intense scrutiny in respect of their compliance with 
the HRA from a range of statutory bodies, including the Office of the Information 
Commissioner and the Equality and Human Rights Committee. 
The introduction of the HRA provoked significant public and political debate 
that has continued in respect of a range of criminal justice issues (from the voting 
rights of those sentenced and imprisoned, to police uses of samples and prints). The 
HRA has frequently been derided in the popular press as a mechanism that affords the 
guilty too much protection by constraining the activities of criminal justice agencies. 
It is not surprising, given the pivotal role that the police service occupies in the 
criminal justice system, that policing has often been at the centre of claims that the 
HRA hinders or prevents the successful social control of criminals. Senior police 
officers have themselves made public statements about the ways in which the HRA 
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The qualified rights—Arts. 8–11—guarantee, respectively, the right to private and family life, home 
and correspondence; freedom 
of thought, conscience and religion; freedom of expression; and freedom of peaceful assembly and 
association. 
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interferes with the policing of serious offenders.
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 Yet, whilst there has been some 
academic commentary on the impact of the HRA in policing (e.g. Harfield 2009; 
Neyroud and Beckley 2001) and policy documents and guidelines have discussed the 
implications of the act (e.g. APA 2008), there has, to our knowledge, been no 
empirical research on the influence of the HRA on the organizational structures and 
processes of the police service and the day-to-day routines and practices of police 
officers. 
In seeking to make an initial contribution in this empirical vacuum, this article 
draws on data produced during qualitative interviews with police service personnel. 
We conducted 20 individual interviews with warranted officers and civilian staff in 
one county police service in March 2011. The interviews focused on officers’ 
experiences and perceptions of policing in relation to the HRA. The sample of 
participants comprised officers from a broad range of ranks—from police constables 
through to the ACPO ranks—who were engaged in diverse roles ranging from 
(detective) constables through to specialist surveillance officers. The officers we 
spoke to were, on the whole, long-serving and many had experienced the 
implementation of the HRA. Our initial focus in the interviews was on the impact of 
Art. 8 (which guarantees the right to respect for private and family life), but most 
interviews widened to incorporate discussion of a range of articles contained in the 
HRA (particularly the qualified rights set out in Arts. 8–11
2
). 
A clear finding of our research is that police officers perceive the HRA to have 
had a very significant impact upon policing. Officers told us that the HRA had 
‘absolutely and unquestionably’ had an impact ‘in lots of ways’ (Officer 2), had 
forced the police service to ‘stop and think’ about the outcomes of their practices on 
individuals and the wider community in ways that they did not do before (Officer 3) 
and had led to the development of a ‘new framework’ (Officer 3) through which 
police officers carry out their work. Throughout this article, we focus on this new 
framework and consider how it impacts upon Anglo-Welsh policing. In contrast to 
findings recently reported by the Joint Committee on Human Rights (2009)—which 
contained statements by police officers about the significant impact of the HRA on 
policing—we do not take officers’ statements at face value. Rather, we show that, 
whilst the HRA has had a considerable effect in creating a set of bureaucratic 
processes to which police officers must adhere, officers do not regard such processes 
to have significantly changed police practices. An important finding from our research, 
therefore, is that, whilst the HRA has bureaucratized police practice in a number of 
ways—institutionalizing processes through which officers justify, document and 
make auditable their decision  making—there is no evidence to suggest that 
operational police work has fundamentally changed in response to the legislation. 
Throughout the article, we argue that a key consequence of the 
bureaucratization of the HRA in policing is that officers rarely regard the act as an 
instrument designed to drive a concern with human rights. This finding is in sympathy 
with Harfield’s observation that ‘legislated rights, whilst generating increased activity 
for government officials and lawyers, do not necessarily nourish a culture that 
provides enhanced rights protection for the community whilst simultaneously 
stimulating dialogue between community and professionals’ (Harfield 2009: 104). 
Indeed, far from ‘stimulating dialogue’ about human rights, our research shows that 
the HRA has enabled officers to engender new strategies and tactics to make their 
existing practices work within the requirements of the legislation. We show that, far 
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from constraining police work, the HRA is regarded as a development that enables 
and facilitates policing, allowing officers to justify their decision making and, in 
doing so, providing them with a safety net in the event that they are asked to account 
for their actions. 
Our findings tend to concur with much of the extant literature that examines 
the impact and effect of legal rules within policing. Commentators have long argued, 
in respect of a wide range of jurisdictions and contexts, that, when police officers 
translate black-letter law into operational police actions, they rely upon high levels of 
discretion and, as a result, law is enforced in selective, uneven, discriminatory and 
sometimes corrupt ways (see, e.g. Skolnick 1966; McBarnett 1978; Punch 2009; 
Young 1971). Criminologists have consistently argued that the relationship between 
law and policing (and, in particular, any attempt to use law as a top-down method for 
achieving change in police practice) must be understood within the context of 
organizational cultures in which the majority of police officers are ‘characteristically 
ambivalent’ to law (Dixon 2007: 24) and regard knowledge of law as less important 
than an ‘appreciation of local community norms’ (Fielding 1988: 52). As Ericson 
argues, the imposition of legal rules, as a method of administrative control, rarely 
changes police decision making: ‘. . . rules are literally dead letters, dying as the ink 
dries on the paper on which they are published’ (Ericson 2007: 379). This is because, 
as commentators have argued, the effect of legal rules is significantly determined by 
the ‘police cultures’ in which they operate and the ‘working personalities’ of the 
police officers who interpret and enforce them (Reiner 2000; Waddington 1999). 
Academics have more recently focused on the impact of law on police habitus (Chan 
1996; Johnson 2010) in order to show its limitations in shaping the behaviours and 
attitudes of police officers. 
Given the recognized limitations of using law to refashion operational policing, 
the HRA poses particularly significant challenges. This is because the HRA does not 
comprise a series of rules in the same way as other statutory law but, rather, outlines a 
set of principles that public authorities must respect. This distinction is important, as 
Phillipson notes: 
 
‘Rules’ denote norms which, if applied, determine the relevant issue conclusively. 
They thus apply in an all or nothing way. ‘Principles’, by contrast, have a 
dimension of weight and the application of one principle to an issue does not 
necessarily determine it: principles merely argue for a particular outcome; more 
than one may well be relevant to a given issue, and in such a case these competing 
principles must be weighed against each other. (Phillipson 1999: 831) 
 
As we argue below, the competing principles contained in the HRA (particularly in 
respect of the qualified rights) allow police officers significant discretion to mandate 
interference with individual rights. This is not necessary problematic, provided that 
police officers have both a good comprehension of how the principles of the HRA 
inform law enforcement and a systematic method for ensuring that police work 
continuously maximizes the respect for rights wherever possible. What is a problem, 
as we show below, is when existing bureaucratic mechanisms in policing do not 
encourage an adequate reflection on the principles contained in the HRA and, as a 
result, fail to make human rights a weighty principle of police work. 
 
Institutionalizing the HRA 
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In this section, we outline key organizational changes implemented by the police 
service in general, and the force that is the subject of this study in particular, in 
response to the HRA. We begin by outlining the bureaucratic audits instigated by the 
police service in light of the requirements of the HRA and then go on to discuss the 
frameworks developed to ensure that operational decision making is human rights 
compliant. Our overall aim in this section is to demonstrate some of the ways in 
which the HRA has become institutionalized within the police service through the 
introduction of new bureaucratic procedures. Such procedures have to be seen as 
techniques designed to introduce new forms of governance into policing that promote 
an awareness of, and respect for, human rights among police officers (Leman-
Langlois and Shearing, no date). 
 
Internal auditing 
As noted above, the HRA does not contain ‘hard’ rules that police officers must 
follow, but outlines a set of broad principles to which policing must conform. An 
initial response of the police service to the HRA was to audit existing policies to 
establish the extent to which they were already compliant with the principles of the 
HRA. In the force we researched, this took the form of tasking an inspector with the 
job of assessing every aspect of force policy in respect of the legal requirements of the 
Act. Such auditing was driven, in large part, by an early ‘suspicion’ (Officer 15) of 
the HRA and its potentially negative impact on operational policing. Neyroud and 
Beckley (2001: 206) have noted that such audits, which followed legal and 
professional advice, were a ‘key consequence’ of the HRA within the police service, 
since they were designed to identify areas of police work that would require 
additional training and enable the introduction of new ethical standards and codes of 
practice. The aim of this auditing was that it would result in a ‘secure ethical and HR 
compliant foundation underpinning the management and delivery of public services’ 
(Neyroud and Beckley 2001: 211). We return later in the article to discuss the extent 
to which this ethical underpinning has been achieved. 
One outcome of these audits was that police forces amended certain 
procedures to demonstrate that the HRA was being considered by police officers 
when making decisions about both policy and operational practice. For example, one 
of the most fundamental changes that was identified by the officers we interviewed 
was an amendment made to the processes through which operational orders are 
written and police officers are briefed. The police service use a nationally recognized 
standard briefing format for policing operations that is commonly referred to as 
IIMARCH (information, intention, method, administration, risk assessment, 
communication, human rights compliance). The H—for human rights compliance—
was added after the introduction of the HRA. Officers drew attention to how a box is 
now checked on the IIMARCH form to demonstrate that the ‘H’ had been considered 
when operational orders are issued. However, as we explore in more detail below, 
understanding of the principles represented by the ‘H’ is variable among officers. 
 
Legislative regulation of covert practices 
For the officers we interviewed, one area of policing that was viewed to have been 
subject to considerable change following the introduction of the HRA was covert 
investigation. Covert investigation, whilst covering a broad range of practices, can be 
defined as the investigation of a suspect who is assumed to be unaware of any police 
scrutiny (Harfield and Harfield 2008). By its very nature, covert policing interferes 
with the human rights of suspects, most notably in relation to Art. 8 of the HRA, but 
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Some commentators have questioned whether the objective of RIPA—to ensure that certain 
surveillance activities conducted by the police service comply with the HRA—has been achieved 
(Ferguson and Wadham 2003). Certainly, the Office of the Surveillance Commissioner, which has 
responsibility for oversight of aspects of the covert surveillance regime, has noted problems. These 
have included: lack of understanding of the legislation by officers; errors in documentation; late 
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authorizations given by staff who are not empowered to do so; authorizing more than was requested on 
the application; and codes of practice not being readily available to officers (Harfield and Harfield 
2008). 
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also potentially with Art. 6 (Right to a Fair Trial) and Art. 1 of the First Protocol 
(Protection of Property). In terms of Art. 8, covert investigations raise issues about 
interference with the privacy of the primary subject of any surveillance as well as the 
‘collateral intrusion’ created where information is gathered on third parties that are 
associated with the primary subject or unrelated members of the wider community. As 
such, police services have been required to demonstrate that covert investigations 
conform to the requirements of the HRA. 
Demonstrating that covert investigations conform with the qualified rights 
contained in the HRA requires the police to show that any interference with an 
individual’s rights is in accordance with the law, pursues one or more of a series of 
legitimate aims and is necessary in a democratic society to meet those aims. These 
requirements do not therefore, as O’Brien (2010: 128) notes, provide a ‘get out’ 
clause for the police but compel officers to justify any interference with rights in 
relation to specific criteria. At the point at which the HRA was introduced, the police 
service faced the problem that, although covert policing was established as ‘part and 
parcel of modern police work’, actions were not regulated by statute (Cheney et al. 
2001: 87). Police authority for covert investigations ‘was based on the common law 
principle that whatever is not expressly forbidden by law is permissible’ (Cheney et al. 
2001: 87), or, put more prosaically, the police could ‘do what they wanted as long as 
there was not a law forbidding it or regulating it in some other way’ (O’Brien 2010: 
126). The insufficient regulation of covert investigations, and of the intelligence it 
generated, had led to a series of ‘embarrassing’ judgments against the UK government 
in the ECtHR (Clark 2007: 429). As Maguire (2000: 321) notes, the United Kingdom 
had lagged behind other European states in institutionalizing the principles of the 
ECHR at a domestic level and any changes in policy tended to be the result of 
‘reluctant British governments’ being forced to adapt to adverse decisions from 
trasbourg. There is no doubt, therefore, that momentum for changes in policing was 
gathering well before the commencement of the HRA—during the late 1980s and 
1990s, for instance, piecemeal legislation was introduced to regulate certain aspects of 
covert investigation and official guidance and voluntary codes of practice from the 
Home Office and ACPO were disseminated (Harfield and Harfield 2008)—but it was 
ultimately the HRA that provided stimulus for major reform. 
At the point at which the HRA was enacted, the UK government introduced 
the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) 2000 in order to regulate: 
 
. . . the interception of communications, the acquisition and disclosure of data 
relating to communications, the carrying out of surveillance, the use of covert 
human intelligence sources and the acquisition of the means by which electronic 
data protected by encryption or passwords may be decrypted or accessed. (RIPA 
2000) 
 
RIPA provides a statutory mechanism for the oversight, inspection and review of 
covert investigations along with a complaints procedure.
3
 The purpose of RIPA is ‘to 
seek to provide legality within a framework of accountability’ in order that any 
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interference with human rights is properly justified in terms of legality, legitimacy 
and necessity (Clark 2007: 429). RIPA can be seen to give statutory expression to the 
HRA in order to restrict the discretion of police officers and change a situation in 
which officers could ‘interpret the boundaries of practice as much by relying on the 
spirit of the law as its detailed substance’ (Neyroud and Beckley 2001: 65). As such, a 
key part of the police service’s organizational adaption to the HRA was its 
accommodation of RIPA. 
The officers we interviewed viewed RIPA and the HRA as essentially the 
same legislative instrument. RIPA was described as ‘the operating procedures for the 
HRA’ (Officer 3) and was viewed as having had a significant impact on the processes 
and practice of various aspects of policing. Officers described at length the RIPA 
requirement that any policing action that infringes a right must be legally proscribed, 
pursue a legitimate aim and be necessary in a democratic society. To ensure that 
officers conform to this, police forces have introduced a process of (usually) internal 
authorizations that are issued following a written application made by investigating 
officers. In requesting authorization to engage covert operational tactics, officers fill 
in forms to justify their decision making, document their reasoning and explain why 
the tactics they propose are necessary. Officers are expected to: describe the purpose 
of the investigation or operation; explain what the information is expected to obtain; 
set out the grounds on which action is necessary; identify the potential for collateral 
intrusion; and establish why the form of action is proportionate. This process is an 
important way in which the HRA has been institutionalized within the police 
service.We explore below, in a discussion of how officers justify their decisions and 
interpret the terms necessity and proportionality, the extent to which this bureaucratic 
process produces any meaningful reflection on human rights. 
 
Satisfying the Requirements of the HRA: How Police Officers Understand Necessary 
Policing 
As we argued above, an impact of the HRA on police practice has been the 
introduction of a series of bureaucratic procedures designed to ensure compliance 
with the Act. A key aspect of these procedures is that they require officers to 
demonstrate awareness and respect of the range of human rights embedded in the 
HRA. In respect of the qualified rights (Arts. 8–11), officers are required to 
demonstrate that any policing action that interferes with a right meets the tests of 
being proscribed by law, pursues a legitimate aim and is necessary in a democratic 
society. In this section, we explore how officers understand, interpret and satisfy these 
tests. 
 
Awareness and understanding of the tests 
Officer 8 told us that the requirements of the HRA are: 
 
. . . drummed in from day one in police college. Policing automatically leads to 
interference [with human rights] but needs to be legal, necessary and proportionate 
or you are in trouble in court. Being able to justify this is important. This is at the 
front of your mind from day one—from notebooks, to statements and especially 
when arresting someone: is it legal, necessary and proportionate?  
 
In fact, all of the officers we spoke to were well aware of the need to justify 
their actions and decision making in this way. This is unsurprising, since RIPA, for 
example, requires officers to provide an Authorizing Officer with a justification that 
 
7 
satisfies the tests of legality, legitimacy and necessity. There was difference in 
opinion among officers about the extent to which this requirement created difficulties 
for operational policing. To illustrate, some officers drew attention to the ‘art’ of 
‘constructing the answers to the questions’ on RIPA applications (Officer 4) in order 
to anticipate what would ‘get past’ Authorizing Officers and ‘sell’ their operational 
decisions (Officer 7). Officers told us that they have learned to anticipate what 
Authorizing Officers require and ‘copy and paste’ from Authorizations that have 
previously been successful. In certain cases, officers consult Authorizing Officers in 
advance of submitting an application in order to maximize its chance of success. In 
this sense, officers did not view RIPA Authorities as problematic. However, there was 
a sense of frustration that Authorizing Officers differ in respect of the justifications 
that they require and that submitting officers cannot assume that an application that 
has been successful with one Authorizing Officer will be successful with another. As 
a result, participants drew attention to how some officers ‘moan’ about the ‘goal posts 
changing’ and complain that new justifications for actions have to be established 
(Officer 9). Furthermore, officers feel that Authorizing Officers are not always 
consistent in their decision making and that a previously ‘sold’ application may not be 
successful in the future. 
Whilst all of the investigating officers that we interviewed were well aware of 
the tests introduced by the HRA, the extent to which the key principles of legality, 
legitimacy and necessity became confused and mangled in officers’ accounts was 
striking. In Strasbourg jurisprudence—the cornerstone of interpretation of the rights 
contained in the HRA— legality, legitimacy and necessity are separate aspects of a 
methodological framework designed to establish a fair balance between the rights of 
individuals and the public authorities that may wish to restrict them. The necessity test 
requires a consideration of three interrelated factors: whether any interference with a 
right addresses a pressing social need, whether in meeting that need any interference 
is proportionate and whether such interference is reasonable and sufficient. 
Proportionality is often taken to be the most important factor in determining whether a 
particular practice is necessary in a democratic society, since it is seen as a way to 
‘search for fair balance between the demands of the general interest of the community 
and the requirements of the protection of the individual’s human rights’ (Soering v. 
The United Kingdom, 11 EHRR 439, at para. 89). We found that, in policing, 
however, the concepts of necessity and proportionality are used in distinctly different 
ways from that found in Strasbourg jurisprudence. Not only are they used as if they 
were wholly separable from each other— largely because (as we explore below) 
necessity is misunderstood as legitimacy—but they are rarely used to address the fair 
balance between community and individual interests that the HRA demands. 
Consider this account of the process of making a RIPA application: 
 
I ask: is the proposed tactic necessary and proportionate. Necessity is similar to 
RIPA. You tick a box— normally the prevention of crime—to say why this action 
is necessary. I have to determine whether it does meet that aim and is necessary to 
policing and law. Then I check evidence or intelligence that supports it. You go 
through a framework. Proportionality is defined by do you need a sledgehammer to 
crack a nut? Have we tried everything else and, if not, why? (Officer 12)  
 
In this account, the concept of necessity is being used to describe what is actually the 
legitimacy of any policing action (the prevention of crime). Indeed, in the interviews 
we conducted, officers consistently conflated necessity with legitimacy, using 
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necessity to justify any policing tactic that pursued the aim of preventing and 
detecting crime. In this sense, officers viewed a policing action to be necessary (rather 
than legitimate) if it was perceived to facilitate the prevention or detection of crime. 
The concept of necessity was not used, therefore, as a framework for considering the 
balance between individual rights and community interests, but focused on whether a 
particular action was required to meet a particular policing aim. 
In describing how they approached the question of necessity, officers often 
said that they asked themselves: ‘Am I pursuing the greater good?’ Although this 
question seems to suggest that officers are considering how a policing action may 
meet a ‘pressing social need’, their focus is actually on the legitimacy of their actions 
rather than on their necessity. The officers we interviewed argued that policing 
actions aimed at the prevention and detection of crime always pursue a greater good 
and are therefore necessary. This is problematic, since not all practices deemed 
appropriate and desirable by the police to meet the legitimate aim of crime prevention 
will satisfy the necessity test of the HRA. A recent example of this is the judgment by 
the ECtHR that the blanket retention of samples and prints by police forces in 
England and Wales was, despite pursuing a legitimate aim, not necessary in a 
democratic society (S. and Marper v. The United Kingdom, 2008, ECHR 1581). 
 
Proportionality: sledgehammers and nuts 
As demonstrated by the quote from Officer 12 above, the concept of proportionality is 
now a significant part of policing discourse. Officers regard proportionality as a 
‘watchword’ in policing and a way of introducing checks and balances into police 
decision making (Officer 14). Proportionality was commonly described by officers as 
posing a very specific question: ‘Am I using a sledgehammer to crack a nut?’ Officer 
17, for example, explains that: 
 
Prior to the HRA we used sledgehammers to crack very small nuts. For example, 
in respect of search warrants, maybe ones relating to drugs, we may have at one 
time have gone in to a private property in a very heaving handed way. Now we ask: 
is this a proportionate response? It is a cultural change in the way that we police. 
We question what we are doing in terms of customers. 
 
This was a common understanding among officers who view proportionality 
as a method of matching particular policing actions with particular types of crime. 
Similarly, Officer 2 argued that whether a policing action was proportionate was 
ultimately determined by a consideration of crime type: ‘. . . you wouldn’t want to use 
a sledgehammer to crack a nut—so a surveillance team is too much for shop-lifting—
but for crimes like terrorism, break out the sledgehammer.’ 
Or, as Officer 18 put it: ‘To smash doors in, we have to act in a balanced way. 
If it is a murderer, then it is proportionate. The safety of the public overrides an 
individual’s right to private life.’ 
It is unsurprising that officers believe that interfering with human rights in 
general, and Art. 8 rights in particular, can be justified as proportionate when 
investigating those suspected of committing the most serious crimes. Officers were 
quite clear that there are certain crimes in which interference with, for instance, Art. 8 
rights would automatically be considered proportionate—terrorism being an obvious 
example—and other crime types in which it would not be considered proportionate—
shoplifting being an example frequently given. However, officers did draw attention 
to crimes that they described as falling within the ‘shades of grey’ (Officer 7). 
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Officers suggested that there is a wide variety of crime types that fall somewhere 
between terrorism and shoplifting, where making decisions about proportionality is 
much less clear-cut. They also drew attention to seemingly low-level issues, such as 
anti-social behaviour, that can have a significant effect on people’s lives, and 
necessitate policing strategies that interfere with Art. 8 rights. As a result of this, 
officers stressed that decisions about proportionality must be made on a case-by-case 
basis. 
As well as focusing on the seriousness of offences when deciding which 
policing practices (which ‘hammers’) best respond to particular crime types (‘nuts’), 
officers said they frequently asked a range of questions about the economy, 
effectiveness and efficiency of operational policing. Questions about proportionality 
can therefore be seen to reflect, at least in part, a concern with the cost of deploying 
officers. As Officer 16 argues:  
 
[It] is about alternative methods for getting information. Balancing up 
financial/resource with ability to get information without intrusions. There are 
tensions between resources and rights. Don’t smash a walnut with a bulldozer. 
Don’t do weeks of surveillance on someone for spitting. [Avoid] disproportionate 
use of resources. 
 
These examples of how officers understand and apply the concept of proportionality 
raises questions about the extent to which it is used as a framework to achieve the fair 
balance of individual rights and community interests required by the HRA. The  
tendency among many of the officers that we interviewed, to reduce considerations of 
proportionality to assessments of the seriousness of offences and of resourcing, has 
been noted and criticized by the Office of the Surveillance Commissioner in relation 
to the completion of RIPA applications: 
 
Greater precision in articulating why the activity is proportionate is still required in 
many authorisations. A failure to detail other less intrusive means considered 
suggests that minds are either not applied rigorously or that some tactics are 
considered routine. Nor should there be over-reliance on the seriousness of the 
crime as an automatic justification of proportionate covert surveillance. A wise 
Authorising Officer will ensure that details of his consideration are recorded; he 
may find them helpful if cross-examined some time later. Similarly, force strategic 
priorities and cost-effectiveness, of themselves, provide insufficient basis for 
authorization. (OSC 2010: 12) 
 
Whilst the Office of the Information Commissioner does not regard 
considerations of either the seriousness of an offence or the cost-effectiveness of 
policing as sufficient for satisfying questions of proportionality, police decision 
making is very much focused on these areas. 
 
Risk not rights 
A further way in which police officers approach the question of whether their actions 
are necessary is through a consideration of the risks posed by individuals and the 
strategies needed to manage them. Officers repeatedly drew attention to how the 
police service has become increasingly concerned with managing risks and threats 
since the turn of the century (one aspect of a more general tendency in contemporary 
criminal justice policy and practice as noted by many criminologists, e.g. Hope and 
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Sparks 2000; O’Malley 2010; Stenson and Sullivan 2001). The result has been, 
officers argued, a proliferation of ‘risk technologies’ throughout police practice. 
Officers are expected to make assessments—sometimes using standardized 
management tools—of the risk posed by dangerous offenders and to vulnerable 
victims. Officers working in particular specialist areas—for instance, in the field of 
child protection, the management of sex offenders, domestic violence, and data and 
information management—all argued that structured decision making and the 
generation of risk assessments was now an important component of their day-to-day 
routines. To illustrate this, officers drew attention to how attending officers present at 
scenes of domestic violence are expected to fill in standardized risk assessment forms 
in order to quantify the level of risk posed to women and children. The score recorded 
on the form should then be used to shape the nature of the police (and other agencies’) 
response to that incident. Whilst it should be stressed that the extent to which such 
technologies have become embedded in police practice, or effectively measure and 
minimize risk in the ways that they purport, is questionable (Chan 1999), the focus on 
risk is now ubiquitous in policing and officers have increasingly become ‘information 
brokers’ who utilize a range of information and intelligence to assess and mitigate 
dangers in contemporary societies (Ericson and Haggerty 1997).  
Whilst our focus is not explicitly on the issue of risk and we did not seek to 
examine in detail how policing is implicated in the management of ‘risk society’, a 
concern with assessing and documenting risks was present in officers’ accounts of the 
impact of the HRA on the police service: 
 
It’s about risk, I don’t think its human rights. If I am going to arrest someone 
human rights and the impact on their private life isn’t in my mind, to be honest. 
(Officer 13) 
 
The only thing I can think about how the HRA has effected policing is in risk 
because it has become important that we document everything. (Officer 19) 
 
As these officers explain, risk overrides rights. Although interference with 
rights requires justification (the documentation of everything), the HRA is seen to 
provide a framework that facilitates an assessment of the dangers posed by individuals 
and the level of response required to contain this risk. As Officer 5 explains: 
 
Necessity and proportionality . . . this is about the crime type and how dangerous a 
person might be viewed to be. So a dangerous individual known for domestic 
violence would be watched more closely than a drunk driver. Whilst the drunk 
driver is a risk the nature of the risk is different . . .. But seriousness of the case 
will affect the decision as well. Seriousness of risk and offending is considered, 
what you know about the person using the intelligence systems. Everything is 
taken into account . . .. The amount of resources are also considered in thinking 
through risk. 
 
Police officers view themselves, as Officer 11 puts it, as ‘managing risk’. Risk 
is central to decision making about necessity and proportionality because, as Officer 
13 explains, it is the basis on which assessments are made about the potential impact 




We have more freedoms now than ever before in some respects. But we have to be 
proportionate. Again, if I arrest someone do I need to handcuff them? If they are 
compliant then handcuffing could be disproportionate. It’s about not going over the 
top. But proportionality is down to perception of risk, of what someone is doing. It 
is down to the individual and how they perceive the situation. To decide 
proportionality in my job I would look at the history, context and victim in the 
situation to determine the risk and how to manage it. 
 
Many of the officers we spoke to conveyed the same understanding of the 
centrality of risk to questions of necessity. The principle factor being considered by 
officers, therefore, is not the impact of police actions upon the rights of the individual, 
but the risk that an individual may pose. That is not to suggest that police officers do 
not consider the impact of their actions upon human rights—they do consider the 
collateral intrusion of their actions and attempt to mitigate these—but their 
considerations rarely focus on the target of their activities. In other words, any explicit 
concern with human rights relates to either those individuals who may get caught in 
the net of an investigation or the general public who are at risk from offending. In 
respect of suspects, questions of necessity are overwhelmingly focused on how to 
apply the most efficient and effective means of addressing any dangers they pose. 
It is clear that officers’ understanding of rights is significantly influenced by 
their concern to manage risks and the interaction of these two, sometimes competing, 
discourses has been the subject of academic debate. In response to Hudson’s 
argument, that the best way to avoid ‘no-holds-barred risk control’ in the criminal 
justice system is to encourage ‘a whole-hearted embrace of the ideas of human rights’ 
(Hudson 2001: 110) and Zedner’s view that adherence to ‘legal strictures enshrining 
basic values such as equality, fairness, and the preservation of basic human rights’ is a 
way of regulating risk control strategies (Zedner 2006: 425), Murphy and Whitty 
(2007) contend that the twin discourses of risk and rights work in subtle, and often 
unpredictable, ways in criminal justice practice. As Murphy and Whitty argue, there 
has been little empirical research on how rights discourse impacts upon ideas about 
risk in the criminal justice system. They argue that what is needed is ‘a new strand of 
academic enquiry focused on the co-existence of risk and rights’ and for ‘scholarship 
which recognizes the social construction of both risks and rights, investigates public 
sector regulatory models, and pays close attention to the apparent mobility and hybrid 
quality of legal knowledges’ (Murphy and Whitty 2007: 811). The data presented 
above empirically demonstrate that, whilst a rights discourse has become established 
in policing, the dominant discourse among officers is one of risk. Whilst this is 
unsurprising, given the nature of police work, what is salient is the way that the 
language of risk can be used to trump rights and, as a result, provide a way for police 
officers to easily justify interference with rights as necessary. 
It is no criticism to point out that police officers use high levels of authorized 
discretion in determining which course of action to take in respect of the risk posed by 
individuals or groups in society. Whilst such decision making may, at times, create 
controversy in relation to particular policing actions—for instance, in recent debates 
about public order policing in London—an assessment of risk is an inherent and vital 
aspect of police work. What is clear, however, is that the prevalence of any risk tends 
to override, in very fundamental ways, a concern for individual human rights. The 
focus in policing on the rights and freedoms of the public elevates the status of the 
collective over the individuals who are subject to police actions. In an interview with 
Officer 15, who provided an unusually explicit reflection on the importance of 
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balancing individual rights with community interests, the importance of risk is 
nevertheless made clear: 
 
Proportionality is subjective. It is trying to weight up all the factors of a situation. 
Take [the disclosure of information about an individual]. What I have to weigh up 
is . . . what the risk is, and should [others] have access to certain material. This is 
tricky because I am impacting upon a person’s private life if I disclose information 
about them. But I tend to er on the side of caution. 
 
To ‘er on the side of caution’ is to view the potential for risk to the community 
as a more fundamental concern than the rights of the individual. This is contrary to the 
requirements of the HRA that, although affording public authorities the ability to 
interfere with an individual’s rights in order to meet the aim of preventing and 
detecting crime, demands that an overriding concern be on justifying the necessity of 
the interference. Considerations of necessity should, as well as addressing social 
needs, focus on the individual and raise questions about what impact any policing 
action will have on them. Yet, whilst there is a tacit acknowledgment of the impact of 
policing on individual rights, considerations of necessity are fixed on an assessment 
of risks to the community and the effectiveness of actions designed to address these. 
 
A commonsense approach 
In the quote above, Officer 15 states that decision making in respect of proportionality 
is subjective. When officers used this term, they were pointing to the individual nature 
of police decision making and how questions of proportionality are heavily dependent 
on officers’ own judgments. Again, this is hardly surprising in policing, where, 
confronted with a range of different situations involving multiple parties, officers 
weigh up and balance competing interests. However, in other public services in which 
coercion and force are used to address risky behaviour—for example, in health and 
social care (see, e.g. Commission for Social Care Inspection 2007)—frameworks have 
been developed to ensure a respect for individual rights. The officers we spoke to did 
not identify any specific framework to achieve a balance between the need to mitigate 
risks and the responsibility to respect rights. Officers regard decision making in 
relation to risk to be grounded, not in a formal human rights framework, but in a 
subjective and commonsense understanding of the needs of the communities they 
serve. As Officer 15 stated: 
 
You run through the human rights aspects but you can’t get bogged down by them. 
You can over-complicate it, but with experience you know what is the right thing 
to do. I ask: what would the average man or woman on the street want? What 
would my mum and dad want? 
 
Many of the officers we spoke to said that an overriding consideration in 
respect of their decision making involved asking the question ‘would an average 
person think it was ok to do this?’ and assessing what ‘the community would expect’ 
(Officer 3). This involved, they said, ‘subjective judgment’ that ‘comes down to 
information and whether the information is sufficient’ (Officer 4). In the next section, 
we explore how the ‘subjective judgments’ required by the HRA have not meant that 
policing has become ‘bogged down’ by human rights or experienced a ‘rights-
enmeshed halt’ (Dixon 2007: 33). Rather, as we demonstrate, the HRA is regarded by 




The Impact and Consequences of the HRA on Operational Policing 
Whilst the HRA has required police officers to demonstrate that their actions are legal, 
legitimate and necessary, an important finding from our research is that officers 
regard the bureaucratic processes created by the HRA to be a largely positive and 
useful development for the police service. Far from expressing the negative attitudes 
towards the HRA that are symptomatic of popular debate about policing, officers’ 
accounts regard the force-level procedures designed to satisfy the HRA as useful to, 
and affirmative of, police work. Officers gave three main reasons for this: first, they 
saw the principles derived from the HRA as enabling, rather than constraining, of 
police work; second, they viewed the processes designed to ensure conformity with 
the HRA as providing a robust framework through which to justify policing actions; 
and, third, they regarded the processes to provide an important level of accountability 
to police decision making. Whilst officers noted some problems with the bureaucratic 
processes created by the HRA—particularly with regard to covert policing—their 




As noted above, it is common to find claims in the popular press that the HRA is a 
straightjacket that prohibits effective policing. The same claims are sometimes made 
in policy and academic contexts. For instance, at a conference held by Justice in 2007 
on the theme of Human Rights and Policing, Richard Perks (and others) made 
speeches about how police officers were being deterred from using their full powers 
because of ‘unfounded fears that their actions may be deemed unlawful’ under the 
HRA and the director of Justice called for ‘education, education, education’ among 
police officers to dispel these myths.
4
 Yet, despite these claims, we found no evidence 
among police officers that the HRA was viewed as constraining or negative. On the 
contrary (and perhaps surprisingly), we found that most officers believed that the 
HRA enabled and facilitated their work. 
 The notion that the HRA has strengthened and underwritten police powers was 
present in officers’ accounts of the impact of the Act on their day-to-day work. 
Officers told us that the qualifications written into Arts. 8–11 provide them with 
considerable scope in which to act. For example, one officer drew attention to the 
‘exceptions’ in the HRA (by which he meant the qualifications) as ‘sufficient to give 
the police the powers that they need to do their job’ (Officer 1). Officers also drew 
attention to how the legislative and bureaucratic procedures introduced by RIPA to 
meet the requirements of the HRA enable police officers to more effectively use their 
powers because, as we discussed above, it has clarified the legality of covert 
surveillance: ‘. . . it allows us to target offenders lawfully’ (Officer 3). One officer 
discussed this in detail, stating that the ‘same principles are applied’ in policing but 
that the HRA ‘screws things down and tightens things up’ (Officer 2). Another officer 
suggested that the HRA provides a framework that empowers police officers to secure 
covert intelligence that will more successfully underpin convictions (Officer 12). This 
officer noted that the HRA ‘enables us to demonstrate robust decision-making around 
operational policing’ and was unequivocal that compliance with the requirements of 
the HRA did not shape police practice. On the contrary, this officer argued that the 
HRA enhanced existing police work: ‘. . . we have a defined role in society [and] it 
doesn’t cause us problems.’ A further officer stated that the HRA is a ‘useful tool in 
the arsenal’ of operational policing, and that ‘RIPA allows us to go after offenders—
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in a way that can be justified later’ (Officer 3). At the most extreme, some officers 
even believed that the HRA was responsible for facilitating certain police actions, 
such as the taking of non-intimate samples or the use of CCTV. 
 
Justifying existing police practice 
Officers view the bureaucratic frameworks through which they justify their actions 
and decisions as beneficial to operational policing because they provide a mechanism 
to structure and facilitate both advanced and post-hoc rationalization of a wide range 
of decision making. To illustrate this, one officer stated that, although ‘everything’ in 
policing has ‘to be considered in relation to proportionality, necessity, and legality’, 
this now provides a ‘template for justification’ (Officer 14). The ‘template for 
justification’ has come to be viewed by officers as a framework through which the 
police service can defend, explain and ultimately validate any policing actions. As 
Officer 1 noted, ‘you can’t go wrong if you have, at the back of your mind, a common 
sense answer for your boss if asked to explain yourself’. This officer went on to argue 
that ‘you could usually come up with a policing aim/justification’ for any action or 
decision. 
 Officers use compliance with the tests of the HRA to justify the decisions that 
they make. However, contrary to Neyroud and Beckley’s (2001) view—that 
compliance with the HRA produces ethical policing more attuned to human rights—
the officers we interviewed suggested that compliance with the principles of the HRA 
had engendered little (if any) reflection on human rights. Instead, their overriding 
concern was to make their practices bureaucratically justifiable. As Officer 19 
explained: ‘I complete RIPA forms and it didn’t occur to me that it had anything to do 
with human rights . . .. The HRA . . . is not in my mind. But we do have to justify 
everything we do.’ 
 Because the practice of satisfying the bureaucratic requirements introduced by 
the HRA is on justifying police practice, rather than reflecting on it in terms of its 
impact on human rights, it is not surprising that many of the officers stated that the 
HRA had produced no impact on their day-to-day work: ‘Honest answer is: I don’t 
think anything has changed. It hasn’t made us question the way we operate. I haven’t 
seen any impact. I can’t think of any obvious difference in what we have done’ 
(Officer 11). 
 Even when officers said that they do explicitly consider human rights, they 
suggested that they were unsure how this linked to the bureaucratic compliance built 
into RIPA authorizations: 
 
A lot of my job involves impinging on people’s private lives and I have to be 
justifying this all of the time in terms of legality, necessity and proportionality. I 
am always signing forms saying ‘I have considered human rights’ but I’m not sure 
we understand what we are signing off. (Officer 16) 
 
The institutionalization of the HRA into bureaucratic processes has led to a perception 
amongst officers that they are simply justifying their actions ‘for someone else’s 
benefit’ (Officer 4). This corresponds to Ericson’s description of how police officers 
use administrative frameworks: ‘Accounts are routinized through the use of formulaic 
phrases that not only justify the decisions taken but also serve as a form of rhetoric to 
persuade police audiences—in particular, prosecutors, defense lawyers and judges—
to ratify these decisions’ (Ericson 2007: 377). The result is that the bureaucratic 
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processes established by the HRA do not encourage reflection of how police work 
impacts upon the human rights of suspects and those in wider society. 
 
Accountability 
The HRA is one of many mechanisms through which policing aims and officer 
practices have been rendered publically accountable. It has been viewed to be 
especially important because ‘personal and organizational responsibility for human-
rights compliance and the emphasis on independent oversight provide significant 
additional dimensions to the framework of police accountability’ (Neyroud and 
Beckley 2001: 70). Indeed, many commentaries on the impact of the HRA on police 
accountability regard the HRA as ‘a powerful legal framework making the police 
accountable for their actions’ (Mawby and Wright 2005: 3, emphasis added). In this 
sense, the HRA has come to be understood as legislation that significantly acts upon 
officer attitudes and practices by installing new forms of accountability into police 
practice. 
 The issue of accountability was strongly embedded in officers’ accounts of the 
HRA. However, rather than focusing on the HRA as a mechanism through which the 
police service can be held to account, they focused almost exclusively on 
accountability as a form of self-protection. For officers, accountability was 
conceptualized in terms of the outcome of the processes through which their decision 
making is documented. Documentation of their compliance with the HRA was viewed 
by officers to allow for an audit of their decision making that ultimately protected 
them from criticism, liability or blame. One officer argued that the processes designed 
to ensure compliance with the HRA ‘gives structure to decision making . . . and gives 
you an audit trail and a mechanism to remind you of the decisions you have made’ 
(Officer 5). Another officer, whilst critical of the ‘form filling’, noted that ‘[I] 
document everything to protect myself’ (Officer 8). Similarly, another officer argued 
that whilst ‘officers moan about the paper work’—and that ‘forms are just a way of 
trying to please our masters’—the ‘forms are a good thing as they provide 
accountability’ (Officer 9). Indeed, when officers talked about the relationship 
between the HRA and accountability, they frequently described compliance with the 
HRA as a framework for ‘covering their arses’. One officer stressed that compliance 
with the HRA was important so that officers were ‘covered in the event that mistakes 
are made’ (Officer 5). Showing a consideration of human rights was said to be a way 
of ‘covering our backs’ (Officer 13) and provided a ‘get out of jail card’ (Officer 2). 
 
The problem of bureaucracy 
Whilst the HRA is not generally perceived by officers to have had a negative impact 
upon operational policing, officers did consistently tell us that the bureaucratic 
procedures and processes—especially those institutionalized through RIPA—could 
potentially slow down operational activities in certain areas of policing. The issue of 
the bureaucracy created through RIPA has been noted in official publications, 
including Flanagan’s review of policing (Flanagan 2008), a Home Office consultation 
on RIPA (2009) and in reports of the Office of Surveillance Commissioners (OSC 
2009). One of the areas identified by officers as most problematic was the effect of 
the bureaucracy created by RIPA, designed to satisfy the requirements of the HRA, in 
respect of gaining authorization to deploy surveillance teams and to extract 
information from mobile phones and computers. As we have seen, it is certainly not 
the case that RIPA prevents the use of covert surveillance techniques but, instead, 
requires officers to justify and document their decision making in particular ways. 
 
5
Overt examination of mobile telephones (e.g. with a suspect’s knowledge and permission) is 
facilitated by the Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1984, whereas covert examination (e.g. where a suspect is unaware) requires 
authorization under RIPA. 
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Whilst, as we noted above, officers saw many benefits in RIPA, they also identified 
the problems associated with ‘form filling’. One officer (Officer 2) said that, prior to 
the HRA, officers could seek permission to deploy covert surveillance by simply 
asking their supervisor and decisions about whether to grant this permission would be 
shaped largely by a consideration of resource implications. By contrast, this and other 
officers stated that the new processes for documenting decisions and for gaining 
authorizations were onerous. One officer noted that ‘life must have been a lot easier’ 
before the HRA, RIPA and the assorted processes that must now be followed (Officer 
20). 
 A key problem identified by officers in respect of RIPA was the amount of 
time spent gaining authorization in the pre-investigative stages of an inquiry. Whilst 
officers saw the benefit of the HRA in making them ‘stop and think’ about their 
actions, they complained that it sometimes slowed them down in problematic ways. A 
frequently used example was the delays they experienced in gaining access to data on 
suspects’ mobile phones. Many officers viewed such data as increasingly useful, since 
they may provide far-reaching insight into suspects’ activities, networks and, in some 
cases, will be the scene of the crime itself. However, lawfully seizing mobile phones 
does not permit officers to covertly examine the information contained on them.
5
 
Such examinations are regulated by the Police Act 1997, as well as RIPA, and the 
appropriate authority will depend on where the data are actually held (Harfield and 
Harfield 2008). Many officers noted that the process of gaining authorization to 
extract information from mobile phones was slow. Officers raised similar issues for 
extracting information from computers. However, whilst the HRA was sometimes 
blamed for creating such delays, it was clear from officers’ accounts that delays were 
as much about the resources available and backlogs in forensic examination. Officers 
therefore blamed the HRA for significantly slowing down police activity when wider 
organizational factors were also playing a role. 
Official reports have also identified slowness to be the outcome of officers’ 
mishandling of authorization procedures. Flanagan, for instance, raises concern that 
‘in some instances excessive bureaucracy is created by a combination of 
misunderstanding and sometimes over-interpretation of the relevant rules’ (Flanagan 
2008: 61). Similarly, the Home Office (2009) has stated that any 
 
. . . potential invasion of privacy caused by using techniques regulated by RIPA 
should be properly justified in a clear, concise paper trail. We do not accept that 
short-cutting this trail would produce a better outcome, but we do accept that 
clearer guidance is needed to assist some public authorities to get the balance right. 
(Home Office 2009: 8) 
 
 And the Surveillance Commissioner has argued: 
 
I have repeatedly commented that the bureaucracy some complain about is often 
self-inflicted and due to police officers’ failure to construct their documents 
concisely and with clarity . . . producing this trail is essential to proper observance 
of the legislation and is not meaningless bureaucracy. (Office of Surveillance 
Commissioner 2009: 19) 
 
Some of the problems raised by officers about bureaucracy may therefore be 
overstated. In urgent situations, authorization can in fact be gained orally from an 
 
6
Figures provided by the Office of Surveillance Commissioners suggest they are relatively rare. 
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Authorizing Officer and the justification for actions can be documented later.
6
 In this 




This article has drawn on the accounts of police officers in order to consider the 
impact of the HRA on police practice in England and Wales. The incorporation of the 
ECHR into English law, through the HRA, was, in part, driven by a desire to generate 
a greater rights culture in all public authorities. We have shown that the HRA has 
failed to embed a culture of human rights awareness in policing. The effect of the 
HRA, whilst profound in the capacity it grants to individuals to complain of violations 
to their rights in the domestic courts, has not been to promote a vocabulary of rights 
among police officers. On the contrary, whilst most officers were highly competent at 
talking about the bureaucratic requirements of the HRA, they had little substantive 
knowledge of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the HRA. Many of the officers 
we interviewed were candid about this lack of knowledge, showing us copies of a 
pocket sized book that, having been issued soon after the HRA came into force, they 
had retrieved from their office drawers and bookshelves in order to ‘revise’ for their 
interview with us. In short, the HRA has not acted as a mechanism through which 
awareness of human rights has trickled down from Strasbourg to local policing. 
 The limited impact of the HRA on understandings of human rights among 
police officers does not, in itself, lead to the conclusion that police officers act 
contrary to the spirit of the rights contained in the Act. However, it does suggest that 
the HRA has been unsuccessful in creating new forms of reflection on human rights 
among officers. This is unsurprising, since previous research on solicitors and courts 
suggests that the HRA is hardly used in the criminal justice process and has had very 
little influence on English due process in the lower courts (Costigan and Thomas 
2005). Research has also demonstrated that, more broadly, public service workers 
have limited awareness of the HRA or how human rights principles relate to their day-
to-day activities (Donald et al. 2008). This is, therefore, not a problem that is unique 
to policing. But it is a problem that police forces must address if they wish to claim—
as many of them would—that policing is driven by a concern to respect human rights. 
A culture of human rights in policing requires more from officers than compliance 
with bureaucratic procedures in order to satisfy force policy and protect them from 
criticism. It requires, as Lamb (2008) argues, the development of new ‘cultural 
capacities’ based on the ideas of respect, equality, toleration, dignity, fairness, 
transparency and democratic accountability from which police officers can draw 
inspiration in carrying out their work. It demands an appreciation among police 
officers of how police work might contribute to greater respect for, and protection of, 
human rights in society. At the very least, it necessitates an understanding of the 
fundamental objectives of the HRA and the framework that it provides for achieving a 
fair balance between the demands of the community and the protection of human 
rights. 
 Our overall conclusion, therefore, is that the HRA has, without question, been 
important for the police service. It has bureaucratized aspects of decision making, 
forcing officers to justify and document the rationale for breaching human rights in 
ways that render their actions visible and open to audit and inspection. However, 
whilst these processes of justification may slow down police decision making in 
certain sets of circumstances, they have not fundamentally changed police practice. 
The HRA is understood by officers to enhance police powers, mandate police 
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decision making and ultimately protect officers from potential criticism and blame. In 
contrast to much of the public comment on the HRA, our research shows that officers 
regard the HRA to have had a positive impact on the police service. However, given 
that the aim of the HRA is to promote and enhance a fair balance between the rights 
of individuals and the public authorities that may wish to restrict them, the 
institutionalization of the HRA by the police service cannot be seen to have succeeded. 
New bureaucratic processes designed to satisfy the requirements of the HRA do not 
currently encourage officers to focus on the balance between individual human rights 
and community interests but, instead, emphasize the importance of risk, effectiveness 
and resources. We argue that, whilst the HRA has had a significant impact on police 
service procedure, it has not created police practices more attuned to the fundamental 
questions of human rights. 
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